1. Field of the Invention
The present inventions relate generally electronic voting methods and systems.
2. Description of the Prior Art and Related Information
Conventional voting systems rely upon pre-printed paper ballots and locked ballot boxes. An intermediate generation of technology uses punch cards (e.g., IBM punch cards). These machines have become notorious for ambiguous results from so-called hanging, dimpled or pregnant chads, such as can occur when the machine fails to completely punch out the voter's choice. With such punch cards, recounts are possible either by machine or by hand, but ambiguous cards, faulty mechanisms and the variability introduced by human judgment all influence the outcome of the recount. Newer electronic voting machines include eletromechanical devices that record entries within the machine itself. No printed record of the vote remains in such machines, making recounts difficult. Most recently, states have begun to deploy computer-based voting systems, where the human interface includes, for example, touch screens or other input means. Many of these computer-based voting systems have no provisions for generating a tangible record of the votes. This renders recounts difficult, impossible or all too easy, depending on one's point of view. Indeed, in most cases, recounts carried out using such computer-based systems result in exactly the same result each time a recount is carried out, as the algorithm for processing the votes is fixed, rendering the outcome of the recount wholly invariant and deterministic.
One of the main problems with electronic voting machines that do not generate an independently verifiable tangible record of the cast vote is that the voter cannot be certain that the machine actually stored a vote corresponding to the voter's intent. Without some independent tangible record of the voter's intentions, the votes cast in such machines are susceptible to fraud, manipulation and loss. Moreover, changes made after testing or certification to the hardware, software, or firmware of the system or errors in the machine's programming, whether unintentional or ill intentioned, may change the ultimate vote tally and even the result of an election.
Current voting methods are also deficient in terms of absentee ballots. Indeed, absentee ballots are slow to count, cumbersome, expensive to administer and easy to misuse. Fraud is also a concern with absentee ballots, in that it is difficult to ensure against compensation or other voting rule violations by voters and/or their manipulators. This is due to the basic nature of absentee ballots. Voters receive absentee ballots by applying to local voting authorities after having undergone the standard registration procedures. The voters are then typically mailed paper ballots, and from this point on, the paper ballot are effectively outside of the control and supervision of the election officials. The absentee voter may then mark the ballot and mail it back to the local election authorities, signing the exterior of the envelope in order to enable matching to the signature on the voting registration card. This procedure represents a major contrast in security, as compared to the act of voting in a booth under the supervision of poll watchers and officials. That the absentee ballots are mailed by the local election authorities and returned by the voter means that counting absentee ballots will be slow and that they are subject to copying or completion by others while in the supposed custody of the voter (an invitation to vote purchase and other voting fraud), and subject to uncertain conveyance back to the voting authorities. Many states allow return of such ballots through ordinary mail, direct return by self or family or friends, or other insecure means.
Thus, absentee ballots have frequently been the source of problems in close elections, because the result may be uncertain or unknown for a long time pending a definitive count of the absentee ballots or because of suspected or actual voting fraud. Moreover, the inherent difficulties of securing an absentee ballot, completing it, and returning it prior to the close of voting in the voter's local area prevent the votes of many potential absentee voters from being recorded. For civilians traveling or residing abroad, international voting must take place in cooperation with US embassies and consulates. For military personnel stationed abroad, voting takes place in cooperation with the service member's unit. No soldier tasked with defense of his or her country should be deprived of a vote. At the same time, confidentiality and validity are issues not always well served by conventional paper balloting away from poll watchers and other local election officials. Time is of the essence, and properly protected, valid, and effective systems of electronic voting remain to be implemented in practice.